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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Although juries are notably incapable triers of testamentary capa-
city and undue influence, the foregoing precautionary measures in the
drafting and execution of the will provide a means by which to avoid
a jury denial of a will in a contest proceeding. These precautions should
discourage one from a contest against even an "unnatural" will and af-
ford a much stronger case with which to convince the jury if there is a
contest.
ROBERT T. BAXTER.
PRELIMINARY HEARING IS A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING AT
WHICH THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT IS REQUIRED TO HAVE THE ASSIST-
ANCE OF CouNSEL.--Defendant, Robert Galloway White, was arrested
on May 27, 1960. He was charged with murder and both assault and
robbery with a deadly weapon. The preliminary hearing was postponed
and not held until August 9, 1960.1 The defendant, who was not repre-
sented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty at the hearing. The defendant
was called before the Criminal Court of Baltimore for arraignment on
September 8, 1960, but because he was not represented by counsel at
that time the arraignment was postponed. On the following day counsel
was appointed to represent him. The arraignment was held on Novem-
ber 25, 1960 and the defendant entered pleas of "not guilty" and "not
guilty by reason of insanity." At the trial the guilty plea which had
been entered at the preliminary hearing was introduced into evidence
without objection. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, 2 the defendant contended
that the failure of the state to afford him appointed counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing violated his constitutional rights to counsel. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
In a per curiam opinion the Court held the preliminary hearing to be a
critical stage of the proceedings and stated that because the defendant
had not been afforded counsel at this stage he was denied his constitu-
tional right to counsel.3 Setting aside any consideration of prejudice, the
Justices agreed that the presence of counsel at the preliminary hearing
was necessary to enable the accused to know how to plead intelligently.
White v. State of Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963).
The right of a defendant to representation by counsel of his own
choosing has long been recognized and guaranteed in both state and fed-
'The August ninth hearing is not mentioned in the report of the appeal of the con-
viction to the Maryland Court of Appeals. White v. State of Md., 227 Md. 615, 177
A.2d 877 (1962). The record there indicates the defendant was charged before a
magistrate on May 30, 1960. The reasons given for this four day delay were the
continued investigation of a co-defendant's connection with the crime and a sharp
curtailment of magistrates' sittings over the Memorial Day weekend. The United
States Supreme Court report of the case mentions neither the May 30 hearing nor
the reasons for the delay in having a preliminary hearing.
'White v. State of Md., 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877 (1962).
'Upon return of the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals that court reversed the
conviction in the Criminal Court of Baltimore and remanded the case for a new trial
in accordance with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court. White v. State
of Md., 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
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eral prosecutions. 4 This right to secure counsel is so well established that
no question can be raised as to its place in our system of criminal jus-
tice. However, the right of the indigent accused to have counsel ap-
pointed for him is not so well established. The instant case is a signifi-
cant development in the law concerning the indigent defendant's right
to counsel.
The development of the right to appointed counsel under the four-
teenth amendment began with the case of Powell v. Alabama.5 This case
is generally considered the focal case because of the broad language used
by the Court to describe the meaning of the constitutional right to
counsel. 6 In the Powell decision the Court emphasized for the first time
that a defendant has the right to counsel during the critical stages of
the criminal proceedings against him.
7
The scope of the broad rule set forth in the Powell decision was
limited a few years later in Betts v. Brady.8 In that case (non-capital),
the Powell rule was confined to capital cases only. The Court held that
in non-capital cases a rule of "fundamental fairness" was to be applied.
By this test the defendant's right to appointed counsel was to be de-
termined by whether the totality of the facts showed that the defendant
had been afforded due process of law. Without ruling out the possi-
bility that an absolute right to counsel might exist in capital cases, the
Betts decision held that there was no such absolute right in non-capital
cases.
9
'U. S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The
various state constitutional provisions affording the accused the right to counsel are
similar to the federal provision. See MONT. CONST. art III, § 16. In Powell v. Ala.,
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) the Court described the right to counsel of a defendant's
own choosing as follows: "If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court
were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such refusal would be a denial . . . of due
process in the constitutional sense."
-287 U.S. 45 (1932); For a discussion of the history and development of the law of
right to counsel, see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendnent:
A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right", 30 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1962); The
Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MiNN. L. REV. 693 (1961).
6After noting that due process of law requires notice and a hearing as necessary pre-
liminaries to any enforceable judgment, the Court stated:
What, then, does a hearing includel Historically and in practice, in this
country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when
desired and provided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incap-
able, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence or evidence irrevelent to the issue or otherwise inad-
missable. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he knows
not how to establish his innocence. (287 U.S. at 68-69.)
'"[T]he circumstance lends emphasis to the conclusion that during perhaps the most
critical period of the proceedings against the defendants . . . [they] did not have
the aid of counsel in any real sense." (287 U.S. at 57.)
-316 U.S. 455 (1942).
'Language in decisions which followed Betts continued to indicate that there was an
absolute right to counsel in the capital cases. See, e.g., Bute v. Ill., 333 U.S. 640, 674
(1948); Uveges v. Penn., 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
1963]
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The issue of the absolute right to counsel in capital cases was pre-
sented in Hamilton v. Alabama.10 In that case the conviction was reversed
because the state court failed to appoint counsel at the arraignment.
The accused's right to appointed counsel was premised on a determina-
tion that the arraignment" was a critical stage of the proceedings where
"only the presence of counsel could have enabled [the] accused to know
all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently."'21  The de-
cision was not based upon whether the accused was prejudiced by the lack
of representation nor upon a consideration of the totality of the facts of
the case. The defendant was held to be entitled to have counsel ap-
pointed at the arraignment regardless of whether prejudice was shown
and rgardless of what the totality of the facts of the case may have
indicated. The failure of the state court to appoint counsel at the ar-
raignment was a denial of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
The "fundamental fairness" test of Betts, as the basis for determin-
ing the defendant's right to counsel in non-capital cases, was recently re-
considered by the Court in Gideon v. Wainwriqht.'3 This decision, which
overrules Betts, relied heavily upon the broad language originally util-
ized by the Court in the Powell decision. The case may be considered to
have eliminated any distinction between the right to counsel of a de-
fendant in a capital case as opposed to a defendant in a non-capital
case.14 The Court in Gideon views the right to counsel to be of the same
fundamental nature as are certain of the rights found within the first
eight amendments which had previously been made obligatory upon the
states through the fourteenth amendment.' 5 However, the Gideon de-
cision does not answer the question of when in the criminal proceedings
a defendant ought to become entitled to appointment of counsel to in-
sure protection of his constitutional rights.
In the instant case the Court supplies at least a partial solution.
The case holds that the right to appointment of counsel must be satis-
fied prior to the open court stage of the proceedings. This holding is an
extension of the rules of Powell and Hamilton. In Powell the right to
"368 U.S. 52 (1961).
"The nature of the arraignment varies somewhat from state to state, but here the
term is given its usual meaning and is descriptive of the open court proceeding
wherein the defendant is formally read the charge contained in the indictment or
information and is asked to plead to the charge. This stage is to be distinguished
from the preliminary hearing, which usually refers to a proceeding before the com-
mitting magistrate where it is determined whether there has been a violation of
criminal law and whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant to
be guilty of the offense. Typical statutes dealing with these two proceedings are
found in REVISED CODES Or MONTANA, 1947 §§ 94-6101 to 6114 (on nature of and pro-
cedure for the preliminary hearing) and § 94-6514 (on procedure for the arraign-
ment). Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited as R.C.M.
"-See note 10 supra at 55.
"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"The Gideon decision quoted favorably from the now-famous language of the Powell
decision. See note 6 supra. Id., at 344.
"5Those rights which have been held to be of such a fundamental nature that they are
immune to invasion by the state are: the freedoms of the press, speech, religion, as-
sembly and petition for the redress of grievances found in the first amendment; the
command of the fifth amendment that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation; the prohibition of the fourth amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and the ban of the eighth amendment on cruel
and unusual punishment. See note 13 supra at 341-342.
[Vol. 25,
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counsel was discussed as existing at or near the trial. In Hamilton the
right was specifically held to arise at the time of arraignment. In the
instant case the Court is of the opinion that the defendant is entitled to
have counsel appointed at the preliminary hearing.
1 6
By entitling an indigent defendant to have counsel appointed at the
preliminary hearing, the Court apparently rejects any requirement that
prejudice be shown before the accused is entitled to have counsel ap-
pointed. This indicates that the Court is taking a broad view of the
Hamilton rule, and serves as notice that the instant case is not to be
narrowly limited to its facts. The defendant in the Hamilton case was
required by the Alabama procedure to enter certain pleas and defenses
at the arraignment or lose the right to plead them. The Court, in holding
the defendant to be entitled to appointed counsel at the arraignment,
stated that it was not concerned with whether prejudice in fact resulted
due to the absence of counsel. It appeared to have been more conerned
with the mere possibility that prejudice might result from the lack of
counsel. The possibility of prejudice at the arraignment was considered
to be a sufficient basis for holding that the arraignment was a critical
stage of the proceedings. Had the Court intended the instant case to
limit the Hamilton rule to those instances in which there was an actual
possibility of prejudice, then the preliminary hearing would be a critical
stage of the proceedings only because of the possibility of prejudice by
the entry of the guilty plea at that time.
However, the implication that a broad view is to be taken of the
holding of the instant case can be found in a comparison of the position
occupied by the defendant in the instant case with that of the defendant
in Hamilton. Under Maryland law the defendant was not to be formally
charged with a crime at the preliminary hearing, was under no obliga-
tion to enter a plea, and could lose no defenses at that time.' 7 It can
readily be seen that the circumstances confronting the defendant in the
instant case, in which he was required to take no affirmative action to
protect his rights, did not afford the opportunity for prejudice to arise
as did the arraignment in Hamilton. Nevertheless, the Court considered
the preliminary hearing as critical as the arraignment under Alabama
law. This would tend to minimize both the fact that the defendant
entered a plea at the preliminary hearing and any requirement of
prejudice. Thus, it is submitted that the Court is holding that an absolute
right to counsel exists at the preliminary hearing.
16Although the Court took notice of the lack of any requirement under Maryland proce-
dure to appoint counsel at the preliminary hearing the Justices felt that the rule of
Hamilton must apply. Applying the rule to the instant case, the Court stated:
"Whatever may be the normal function of the "preliminary hearing" under Mary-
land law, it was in this case as "critical" a stage as arraignment under Alabama
law." Instant case at 59. Under the Maryland procedure applicable at the time
of the trial in the White case, provision was made for appointment of counsel when
a defendant was arraigned in open court in all capital or other serious cases. MD.
ANN. CODE rule 723(b). It should be noted that as of August 10, 1963, a new revi-
sion effecting the arraignment procedure was adopted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals. This new procedure provides for advising a defendant appearing in court
at any stage of the proceedings that he has the right to counsel. The new rule also
provides for appointment of counsel if the offense is punishable by death or by
imprisonment for six months or more. MD. ANN. CODE rule 719(b) (1) & (2).
17See note 2 supra.
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The developments found in other recent decisions in the field of
right to counsel indicate the critical stage of the proceedings doctrine to
be the test of when the right to counsel arises. The current scope of this
doctrine is defined by the Hamilton and White decisions. In addition, the
Gideon decision suggests which criminal prosecutions will ultimately be
within the scope of the doctrine. The Gideon decision indicates that an
absolute right to counsel exists in all criminal prosecutions, but the
scope of "all criminal prosecutions" is still an open question.'8 Although
the full effect of these decisions has not yet been determined, the opin-
ions do set forth guidelines which indicate the course the Court may be
expected to take in the future.
Under the critical stage of the proceedings doctrine the right to
counsel is not to be limited to representation at the trial or even to rep-
resentation at the arraignment. The critical stage, so far as the rights of
the defendant are concerned, is apparently present very early in the
proceedings and long before arraignment in open court. Since the right
to counsel is not dependent upon any showing of prejudice, it could well
be said to arise even before the accused is brought before the committing
magistrate. 19 It is submitted that it is not necessary to show prejudice
because the fundamental nature of the right to counsel absolutely entitled
the accused to representation, not only for the protection which the
presence of counsel may secure, but also to provide the defendant with
all the benefits which trained counsel may supply. It seems the right to
counsel is viewed as a right basic to those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions."20 Further, this right cannot be denied at any stage of the
proceedings in any capital or non-capital case without such denial result-
ing in a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. 21 In
"'Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), which established the absolute right to counsel
rule in federal criminal proceedings, did not decide the issue for federal prosecutions,
and no subsequent federal case has squarely presented the issue to the Court. Mr.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Gideon indicates that he believes "all crimi-
nal prosecutions" to mean only those offenses which "carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence." See note 13 supra at 351. However, the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Black and the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Clark and
Mr. Justice Douglas do not indicate that any distinction exists between those offenses
involving a substantial prison sentence and those involving punishment of a lesser
degree.
"The Court has recently considered the defendant's right to counsel during the period
immediately following arrest in Crooker v. Cal., 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and in Cicenia
v. LaGray, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). In both instances it was held that no absolute right
to counsel existed during the period of police interrogation. However, both of these
decisions were handed down under the authority of Betts v. Brady and the funda-
mental fairness test. With the overruling of Betts and the abolition of any require-
ment that the right to counsel be founded on a showing of prejudice, these cases
would appear to no longer control the determination of whether the accused has a
right to counsel at the early stages of the proceedings. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Brennan, dissented in Crooker. In this
dissent the specific services which an attorney could perform during the period
immediately following arrest were noted. Without the benefit of these services the
accused was not considered to be assured of due pr6cess. These Justices, even before
the Gideon decision, would have recognized an absolute right of the defendant to
counsel at the time of arrest.
2OPowell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); quoted favorably in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"A requirement that the states furnish counsel before arraignment would provide a
defendant in state court with a right to counsel prior to the time the right would
arise in federal court under the present federal criminal practice. FED. R. CaIm. P. 44
[Vol. 25,
5
Haddon: White v. State of Maryland
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1963
RECENT DECISIONS
some future decision the Court may be expected to hold that an indigent
defendant is entitled to have the assistance of appointed counsel in all
criminal prosecutions from a point shortly after the moment of arrest.
Effect of the White Decision in Montana
The White decision will have substantial effect on Montana criminal
procedure. In Montana the accused has the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel in all criminal proceedings. 22 The statutes also
provide for appointment of counsel for indigent defendants at the time of
arraignment in district court.2 3 However, there is no provision for ap-
pointment of counsel at the preliminary hearing or any other early stage.
An accused who is brought before a justice of the peace upon arrest
must be advised of his rights to the aid of counsel at every stage of the
proceedings. 24 He must be allowed a reasonable time to send for counsel
and the examination must be postponed until counsel can be secured.25
These statutes pertain only to the defendant's right to secure counsel and
do not provide for appointment of counsel.
In the procedures governing the justice of the peace courts there
are no provisions for appointment of counsel at any stage of the pro-
ceedings. Further, the Attorney General of Montana has ruled that the
justice of the peace courts have no authority to appoint counsel at the
preliminary hearing or at any other stage of the proceedings over which
they have jurisdiction. 26 This ruling was based on a finding that the
power to appoint counsel is purely statutory and under the current
statutes such power is vested only in the Montana District Courts.
It is clear the present statutes do not satisfy the rules of either
the Gideon or White decisions. Thus, action should be taken at the next
legislature to consider the enactment of legislation which would insure
compliance with the broad rule indicated by these cases. It is submitted
that legislation should be considered which would contain provisions for
the appointment of counsel for the indigent defendant at least at the
preliminary hearing in all criminal prosecutions.
2 7
provides for appointment of counsel if the defendant appears in court without repres-
entation and is unable to afford his own counsel. FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(b) provides for
advising the defendant at the preliminary hearing of his right to retain counsel.
However, this rule has not been interpreted to give the accused the right to have
counsel appointed at the preliminary hearing. Burall v. Johnston, 146 F.2d 230 (9th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945). An amendment has been proposed to
the present rules governing procedure at the preliminary hearing in federal cases.
This amendment would require the United States Commissioner to advise the accused
of his right to counsel at the hearing. COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMMEND-
MENTS TO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS,
Rule 5 (1962). Adoption of this amendment by the United States Supreme Court
would clearly indicate that the Court believes the defendant has an absolute right to
counsel at the preliminary hearing as a necessary element of due process.
"MONT. CONST. art. III, § 16; R.C.M. 1947, § 94-4806.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6512.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6101.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6102.
215 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 157 (1933).
'As noted, the scope of 'all criminal prosecutions" is not yet defined. However,
providing for appointment of counsel in all proceedings in justice of the peace and
police courts as well as in the district courts would insure maximum compliance with
constitutional guarantees as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
1963]
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Legislation was enacted at the 1963 Legislative Assembly which
authorized the establishment of the current Criminal Law Commission.
28
This body, which is composed of judges from the Supreme Court of
Montana and the district courts, practicing attorneys representing both
prosecutors and defense counsel, and faculty members of the Montana
State University Law School, is currently engaged in drafting revisions
to Montana criminal law and procedure which will be proposed for
enactment at the 1965 Legislative Assembly. The change in the current
law suggested here is similar to at least one of the proposals currently
being considered by the commission.29
This new legislation would be no great departure from principles
and procedures which have long been recognized and made available in
Montana. As noted, the present statutes allow the defendant to secure
counsel at the preliminary hearing.30 Additionally, a Montana statute
affords to any person who is restrained of his liberty for any cause the
right to see and consult with counsel in private if he desires to do so.3'
The proposed changes would do no more than eliminate the distinction
between the rights of a defendant who is able to secure counsel of his
own and the rights of one who is not able to do so.
SAM E. HADDON.
2Laws of Montana 1963, ch. 103, at 202.
2The Committee proposal recommends repeal of R.C.M. 1947 & 94-6512 and enactment
of: When the defendant appears for arraignment or preliminary proceedings, he
must be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before proceeding
and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires counsel, a court
of record must assign counsel to defend him if he is unable to employ counsel. The
defendant may waive his right to counsel except that in all felony cases where the
defendant is under twenty-one (21) years of age, the defendant shall be represented
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, including arraignment, preliminary
hearing, and trial.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6101.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2117.
[Vol. 25,
7
Haddon: White v. State of Maryland
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1963
